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Abstract: N.T. Wright has offered Christian 
philosophers a proposal where it is apparently possible 
to hold the belief in the intermediate state-resurrection 
of the body and an ontological holism in the same sense 
at the same time. I argue that this not only creates a 
basic contradiction in Wright’s ontological paradigm, 
but also it is not a coherent and tenable proposal despite 
the fact one might eventually find a potential solution 
to such a quandary.  
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Introduction 
 
Many questions have risen about the mind-body debate throughout 
the centuries. The topic has not only been of interest to Hebrew and Jewish 
theologians but also to Greek philosophers, not only to the Western but 
also to the Eastern, and similarly, not only to Christian scholars but also to 
mainstream thinkers and philosophers. Therefore, the mind-body debate 
is more than an abstract topic, but a human endeavor. The area I am 
interested in analyzing in this paper is regarding some of the implications 
of holding the belief in the intermediate state-resurrection of the body in 
relation to the nature of the human being. Thus, certain kinds of monists 
(e.g. physical, organic, and holistic) usually claim that when human persons 
die, it happens to be the dissolution of their being. On the contrary, 
dualists––who tend to claim that after bodily death human persons may 
continue to exist––argue that there is a real intermediate state after bodily 
death where human persons exist in a disembodied and temporal form. 
This dichotomy has caused those biblical scholars who hold to dualism 
affirm the intermediate state, while those who hold to the monist view 
deny it. The mind-body debate would not have importance if it did not 
impact people's lives at all. As it does, the discussion has serious moral and 
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ethical repercussions, although postmodern society usually downplays 
those repercussions.  
 
A well-known theologian and scholar who has discussed the nature of 
the human person is N.T. Wright. Besides his ability to articulate in a clear 
theological language, Wright's perspicuity in discussing central teachings in 
the New Testament is noteworthy and admirable. He is a brilliant writer. 
Nonetheless, I find his position and reflections on the reality of the soul 
sort of troubling. Although Wright does affirm a real intermediate state, he 
also defends an ontological holism. How should these contradictory 
positions be treated?  In light of Wright's affirmation of two opposing 
beliefs, I will focus on his article titled “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All 
for One and One for All: Reflections on Paul’s Anthropology in his 
Complex Contexts”1 in order to demonstrate that N.T. Wright's position 
of defending both his ontological-holistic understanding of the human 
person and his belief in a real intermediate state-bodily resurrection in the 
same sense at the same time is not coherent and tenable, despite the fact 
one might eventually find a potential solution to such a quandary.  
 
I. N.T. Wright on the Afterlife 
 
In order to analyze Wright’s inconsistency that emerges from holding 
two opposing beliefs, it is advisable to look at Wright’s position on the 
afterlife. First of all, Wright affirms an actual intermediate state after one 
person’s physical death. In that respect, he writes: 
 
[A]ll the Christian departed are in substantially the same state, that of 
restful happiness. Though this is sometimes described as ‘sleep,' we 
shouldn't take this to mean that it is a state of unconsciousness. Had Paul 
thought that, I very much doubt that he would have described life 
immediately after death as ‘being with Christ, which is far better'. Rather, 
‘sleep' here means that the body is ‘asleep' in the sense of ‘dead,’ while 
the real person–however we want to describe him or her–continues. This 
state is not, clearly, the final destiny for which the Christian dead are 
bound, which is as we have seen the bodily resurrection.  
                                                 
1 N.T. Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All: Reflections 
on Paul’s Anthropology in his Complex Contexts,” 
http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm. 
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But it is a state in which the dead are held firmly within the conscious 
love of God and the conscious presence of Jesus Christ, while they await 
that day. 2 
 
Second, Wright also defends a future bodily resurrection3 where those 
people who had a bodily death in the present life and exist in God’s hand 
(not in a “spirit or angelic” form) will be re-embodied with an immortal 
physical body. Wright takes the phrase “in God’s hand” from the book 
Wisdom of Solomon. He argues that while many theologians have claimed 
that the book portrays the belief in the immortality of the soul, others hold 
that it is the belief in the resurrection that the book defends instead.4 
Therefore, Wright concludes that the Wisdom of Solomon does not teach the 
Platonic pre-existence of the soul, but another kind of immortality––one 
acquired through wisdom and based on the renewed bodily life. Interest 
of this paper is Wright’s idea that the phrase “the souls of the righteous 
are in God's hands” refers to the interim state between death and 
resurrection, and this state of rest is what Dan. 12:13 speaks of, and is also 
the condition of the souls in Rev. 6:9-11. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 N.T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, The Resurrection, and the Mission of the 
Church, (New York: HarperOne, 2008): 171-72. 
 
3 In The Resurrection of the Son of God: Christian Origins and The Question of God. Vol.3, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003): 204 (hereafter: TRSG), Wright speaks of the 
existence of diverse schools of thought regarding the future of human beings after 
physical death in Judaism, and asserts that the concept of resurrection used to have two 
meanings, not just one. On the one hand, resurrection is understood literally as a re-
embodiment, while on the other hand, resurrection is understood metaphysically as a 
metaphorical act of covenant restoration. Therefore, Wright affirms that when 
resurrection is referred to during Second Temple Judaism, it usually had the meaning of 
the second stage of a two-fold process: Of re-embodiment in the ultimate resurrection 
after a disembodied existence during the intermediate state. 
 
4 Wright, TRSG, 174. 
 
5 Wright, TRSG, 174. 
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1.1 On Ancient Judaism: Is There Life after Death?  
 
Wright claims that the resurrection belongs to the Jewish socio-cultural 
and religious context, and not to the Pagan world.6 He clarifies, however, 
that this affirmation does not mean there are several references regarding 
the resurrection in the Hebrew Scriptures; on the contrary, such references 
are a few.7 For Wright, this fact introduces a difficulty both for Christian 
and Jewish scholars interested in studying the resurrection in the biblical 
text: it is in the post-biblical and rabbinical texts where the traditional view 
of the resurrection of the body has mainly taken place.8 Thus, concerning 
the history of Israel, Wright considers there have been three main beliefs 
regarding the afterlife: “absence of hope beyond death; hope for blissful 
life after death; and hope for new bodily after ‘life after death.'”9  
 
 
                                                 
6 Wright affirms that in the ancient Greek culture, Homer is blunt concerning the 
resurrection and that such a belief did not have any sense even in mythological 
discussions. He also claims that this basic image remained vivid through the years during 
the classical Greek period (TRSG, 32-33). Wright argues that although diverse 
philosophical groups emerged later in ancient Greek––for example, Epicureans, Stoics, 
and Platonists who gave different interpretations to the afterlife––nevertheless, none of 
them indeed believed in the resurrection ("Jesus' Resurrection and Christian Origins," 
available at http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_Jesus_Resurrection.htm, sec. 2.i). In that 
regard he writes, “The immediate conclusion is clear. Christianity was born into a world 
where its central claim was known to be false. Many believed that the dead were non-
existent; outside Judaism, nobody believe in resurrection.” (TRSG, 35) Here Wright 
discusses the possibility of the resurrection among Pagans explicitly and not the survival 
of the soul after death. In the case of ancient Egypt, for instance, Wright claims that it is 
not appropriate to speak of resurrection concerning the ancient Egyptian belief in the 
afterlife, since "Mummification and its others attendant practices…imply that the person 
is still ‘alive' in some bodily sense, despite appearances" (TRSG, 47). In sum, Wright 
formulates his concluding remark on the afterlife in ancient Paganism in the following 
short but remarkable sentence: “The road to the underworld ran only one way.” (TRSG, 
81).  
 
7 Wright, TRSG, 85.  
 
8 Wright, TRSG, 86. According to Wright, this hypothesis contrasts with the position held 
by traditional theologians and scholars regarding the existence of a progressive revelation 
in the development of the Scriptures. 
 
9 Wright, TRSG, 86. See also pp. 97-103 for further discussion. 
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For this paper’s purpose, I will refer to the third option only. In that 
respect, Wright claims that although one does not know chronologically 
the moment where hope after the afterlife emerged in ancient Israel, one may 
claim that faithful Israelites understood that the love of God was immense 
and that they would not only enjoy such love in the present life, but after 
they would die as well.10 This would be reflected in the Hebrew Scriptures 
through biblical verses that promote––or at least suggest––the deliverance 
from Sheol, a glorious future after suffering in the present life, and a 
foundation for a future hope.11 There are not many things, one may say, 
about the meaning of those verses, but as Wright affirms, at least one finds 
a reference to future hope based only on God.12 Therefore, in view of 
Wright’s reasoning, this hope led to a development of the something-
happens-after-death belief that appears in several Old Testament 
references.13 The relation between this hope in the afterlife and the 
resurrection is, for Wright, two related but not separate beliefs, since “there 
is not a move away from the hope which characterized all of ancient Israel, but a 
reaffirmation of it” (emphasis of the author). 14 As Wright says, such 
reaffirmation, contrary to the other pagan worldviews of that time, is based 
on the bodily resurrection after death and not simply on the continuation 
of this present life.15 He states, “The promise of resurrection is thus firmly 
linked to creation itself, which was the basis of the normal ancient Israelite 
celebration of life in the present, bodily life in YHWH’s good land.”16 
Although Wright’s position on ancient Judaism is stimulating, one must 
also recognize that his view on the pre-exile Israel might not be shared by 
the majority of biblical scholars.  
 
                                                 
10 Wright, TRSG, 103. 
 
11 Wright, TRSG, 103. 
 
12 Wright, TRSG, 103-108. 
 
13 Wright, TRSG, 108. 
 
14 Wright, TRSG, 121. 
 
15 Wright, TRSG, 122. 
 
16 Wright, TRSG, 122.  
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1.2 On Post-Biblical Judaism: Resurrection vs. Immortality? 
 
Wright argues that the statement that “Jews…believed in resurrection, 
while Greeks believed in immortality” is not only half-truth but also 
misleading since––among other aspects––the Old Testament, he argues, 
“…denies or at least ignores the possibility of a future life, which only a 
few texts coming out strongly for a different view; but in the Second 
Temple period the position is more or less reversed.” 17 Thus, regarding 
the status of the belief of resurrection by the time of Jesus and the Second 
Temple period, Wright writes, 
 
The evidence suggests that by the time of Jesus, roughly in the middle of 
the period we are now examining, most Jews either believed in some 
form of resurrection or at least knew that it was standard teaching. 
Comparatively few remained skeptical. Some held to a kind of middle 
position…in which a blessed, albeit disembodied, immortality awaited 
the righteous after their death. But there is widespread evidence that the 
belief which burst into full flower in Daniel 12 had become standard. 
That text, indeed, seems to stand behind a good deal of the later 
development.18 
As Wright notes, the belief of resurrection has an important 
implication. Linked to the resurrection, there is the belief in the existence 
of an intermediate state where one survives in a disembodied form 
temporally.19 In light of this, Wright asserts with some certainty that the 
belief of resurrection for Second Temple Judaism was understood mainly 
as a “newly embodied existence” and never as “a way of talking about 
ghosts, phantoms, or spirits.”20 Now, to understand better, according to 
Wright, what resurrection meant for first-century Jews, one should pay 
                                                 
17 Wright, TRSG, 129. 
 
18 Wright, TRSG, 129-130. In this same section, Wright reminds his readers not to forget 
the distinction between the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul. In 
the soul-body debate, such terms carry different definitions depending on the context 
(130). 
 
19 Wright, TRSG, 130. Wright also says that linked to the immortality there is the belief 
of that there is an “immortal element, perhaps the soul, which is incapable of dying.” 
 
20 Wright, TRSG, 130. 
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attention to the fact that mainly two major groups shaped the thought in 
the afterlife of the Second Temple Judaism: The Sadducees and the 
Pharisees. For the Sadducees, there was neither any “significant future life 
at all” or resurrection.21 Analyzing briefly Luke's narrative in Acts when 
Paul argues that his case was one of resurrection itself and the council 
became divided, Wright claims that the phrase “neither angel, or spirit” 
does not mean that the Sadducees did not believe in angels or spirits, but 
it “refers to different interpretations of the resurrection––resurrection life 
seen as angelic or spiritual...”22 I find Wright’s argument here not very 
convincing. Though arguable, what the Sadducees denied—for Wright—
was the existence of an interim state where ceased persons might exist in 
an “angelic or spiritual” disembodied form.23 This claim leads Wright to 
assert that during the first century there also was a third group of Jews who 
rejected at the same time the Sadducees’ view and the belief in a future 
resurrection. This third group believed in a perpetual disembodied 
existence, “in which souls, dis-encumbered of their attendant physical 
bodies, would enjoy a perfect life forever.” 24 It is plausible, according to 
Wright, that in contrast to this third group and the Sadducees, the 
Pharisees then defended the belief of the resurrection.25 Another claim that 
Wright also makes here is the one that the translation of the Septuagint 
helped to spread the belief in resurrection by very clearly using resurrection 
language: "Clearly, whoever drafted the translation of LXX Job had no 
doubt both of the bodily resurrection and of the property of making sure 
the biblical text affirmed it."26 Wright goes on with his discussion of the 
                                                 
21 Wright, TRSG, 131. The Sadducees, for Wright, also represented the conservative side 
of Second Temple Judaism by interpreting the Law strictly.  
 
22 Wright, TRSG, 132. Wright cites Matt. 12:23, Mark 12:28, Luke 10:27, Acts 4:1-2, and 
Acts 23:8.  
 
23 Wright, TRSG, 132. Cf. Wright's comment on Acts 12:15 regarding Rhoda's reaction 
when she heard Peter's voice. See p. 134. 
 
24 Wright, TRSG, 140. Wright mentions the writers of the Testament of Abraham and the 
Ethiopic book Enoch.  
 
25 Wright, TRSG, 147.  
 
26 Wright, TRSG, 148. 
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LXX and his link with the belief in resurrection and adds, “All the 
indications are that those who translated the Septuagint, and those who 
read it thereafter (i.e. most Jews, in both Palestine and the Diaspora), 
would have understood the key Old Testament passages in terms of a more 
definite "resurrection" sense than the Hebrew would necessarily warrant, 
and might likely have heard overtones of "resurrection" in many places 
where the Jew would not have suggested it.”27 
 
II. N.T. Wright on Human Nature 
 
In the introduction of his article "Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body," Wright 
says that he will propose a way of understanding the human person as an 
"eschatological integration," based on the fact that for Paul, the temple of 
the Holy Spirit is not the soul or the spirit, but the body.28 Since Wright 
affirms that the soul in most cases refers to the whole person and not to a 
human being who is in the interim state, he questions whether dualism is 
the right way to view and understand the human person and the purpose 
of her existence. Although Wright correctly argues that a reductionist 
approach is not the best way to understand human nature (e.g. 
physicalism), he denies that dualism is the right answer. This is somewhat 
of a surprise because, for a long time, many have assumed that if one 
believes in a bodily resurrection, one should also entail a dualistic view of 
the human person. In Wright's theological line of reasoning, it seems that 
this is not the case. It is clear to me that Wright is not a dualist of any kind, 
but a holistic scholar because of his particular view of the human person. 
In section 2.5.1, I will discuss the kind of perspective that Wright's 
proposal entails. 
 
2.1 Wright’s Arguments Against Dualism 
 
The first area where Wright challenges his readers in "Mind, Spirit, 
Soul and Body" is about changing their perspective on the metaphysical 
supernatural framework where the discussion of the soul usually takes 
place. One should stop, he claims, to look for a "soul of the gaps" in "the 
                                                 
27 Wright, TRSG, 150. 
 
28 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” introduction. 
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bits that neuroscience hasn't yet managed to explain."29 From Wright's 
comments, one observes that he does not understand the soul as an 
ontologically separable entity of the human person. The second challenge 
is concerning the overuse of the word "dualism" in Western thought to 
refer to a diversity of meanings. Wright claims that there are at least ten 
different meanings of "dualism" in biblical studies, and such diversity, 
instead of helping, complicates the study of the Scriptures.30 The third 
claim that Wright makes is against using an Epicurean lens to interpret the 
New Testament, especially Paul’s writings. Having this in view, Wright 
objects the idea that the New Testament supports dualism. He gives two 
crucial reasons: first of all, theologians have missed the point when 
discussing the constitution of the human person, inasmuch as Paul 
"nowhere provide a neat summary of what he thinks;" and second, the 
New Testament use of psyche differs from its usage in Greek Philosophy, 
e.g. Plato. In its place, the New Testament uses psyche as a synonym of 
nephesh, that is, a living creature or the whole person.31 For Wright, psyche in 
the New Testament is better understood as "creature" rather than the 
Platonic understanding of it––the non-material part of the human being.32 
Similarly, he thinks that the conception of a pre-existent soul or the 
"immortality" of the soul as an innate characteristic are Greek notions 
                                                 
29 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1. 
 
30 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1. 
 
31 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1. 
 
32 In Wright’s words, Plato understands the human soul as “the non-material aspect of a 
human being, and is the aspect that really matters. Bodily life is full of delusion and danger; 
the soul is to be cultivated in the present both for its own sake and because its future 
happiness will depend upon such cultivation. The soul, being immortal, existed before 
the body, and will continue to exist after the body is gone.” (TRSG, 49) The implications 
of Plato’s understanding of the soul are many. Wright mentions the most important ones: 
a) there is always a suggestion that the human soul is divine. Wright argues that if the 
Greek gods are immortals–having a divine nature––and the human soul is immortal, then 
the human soul is implied to be divine; b) the human soul survives death and it is glad to 
do so because in the afterlife it will flourish in a different way; c) the soul is imprisoned 
by the human body and the death is the event where such liberation happens; and d) the 
death should be an event not to avoid but to embrace. For further discussion about Plato 
and his views on the human soul, see TRSG, 50-52. 
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since one does not find proof of such beliefs in the Scriptures.33 
 
2.2 Soul as Predicable of Embodied Persons 
 
Wright also argues that the word psyche was never used in the New 
Testament as “a way of talking about ghosts, phantoms, or spirits.”34 That 
is, for Wright, the soul is predicable only of embodied persons. In response 
to this, one should take into account that the use of psyche in the New 
Testament is not uniform: the term is used as a synonym for the whole 
person, and in some cases, it also seems to refer to the non-material part 
of the human being. To prove this, one only needs at least a counter-
example that supports such a position in the Scriptures. John W. Cooper 
offers two counterexamples that can be used against Wright's assertion, 
where he shows that the word psyche might refer to disembodied human 
persons, probably in the intermediate state: Heb. 12:23 and Rev. 6:9-11.35 
Though they are strong arguments against such a reading, what matters 
here is demonstrating that Wright's affirmation that all New Testament 
writers refer to the soul and spirits exclusively as embodied people is not 
always true.36  
 
2.3 Soul Is Not a Vessel of Spirituality 
 
Another interesting discussion in Wright’s "Mind, Spirit, Soul and 
Body" is the intrepid claim that "[t]here is no reference anywhere in the 
NT to the psyche as the carrier or special vessel of what we would now call 
spirituality or openness to God.” 37 Wright cites the case of 2 Cor. 12 where 
Paul affirms that he did not know if the experience he had was in the body 
or not. Using this example, Wright claims that in any case––whether the 
experience was in body or not, one cannot affirm that the "non-bodily 
                                                 
33 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1. 
 
34 Wright, TRSG, 130. 
 
35 John W Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-
Dualism Debate, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000): 113-115. 
 
36 Cooper recognizes, however, that this position is debatable. Cf. Body, Soul, and Life 
Everlasting, 113. 
 
37 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1.  
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element... is the crucial, defining part of the human being."38 This leads 
Wright to hold that the Scripture does not allow a dualistic understanding 
of the human person.39  
 
2.4 The Promised End: An Immortal Physical Body 
 
Wright alleges in his article that in order to have an adequate biblical 
anthropology, one should start “at the promised end and work 
backwards.”40 That promised end is––following Paul––the immortal 
physicality or an “emphatically bodily body…beyond the reach of sin, pain, 
corruption or death.” Therefore, the concept of embodiment is of central 
significance in view of the Christian hope.41 Consequently, downplaying 
the body––Wright thinks––disregards the created order.42 He states, 
 
[W]hy would one want to argue for something so thin and flat as dualism? 
Of course we must resist something even thinner and flatter, namely the 
monochrome reductionism of materialists and the like. But we don’t have to 
choose between stale bread and stagnant water. A rich meal is set before us, 
and every course and every wine contributes to the complete whole.43  
 
                                                 
38 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 1. 
 
39 It must be highlighted Wright’s comment on Plato: “If Homer functioned as the Old 
Testament for the Hellenistic world––which by the first century included the entire 
Middle East––its New Testament was unquestionably Plato,” Wright creatively writes 
(TRSG, 47-48). For Wright, it is the belief in the soul as the self rather than a physical 
body that differs from Plato and Homer in the understanding of the afterlife (TRSG, 48). 
In that sense, Wright argues that the Platonic view of the afterlife [ontogical dualism] 
strongly shapes the Gnostic worldview. There is no space to continue discussing this, but 
what must be noted for this paper's purpose is Wright's claim in that regard. He states, 
"It is hard to overestimate the importance of Homer and Plato for the later, and wider, 
world into which, all unexpected, there bursts the phenomenon we know as Christianity" 
(TRSG, 53). 
 
40 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 2. 
 
41 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 2. 
 
42 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 2. 
 
43 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 2. 
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2.5 Concluding Remarks on Human Nature 
 
Throughout his project about the soul-body in "Mind, Spirit, Soul and 
Body," Wright defends a “differentiated unity,” though he does not offer 
further details of it. He finds certain support in claiming that the writers of 
the New Testament did not usually define the terms they were using: the 
anthropological terms the biblical and Christian writers used do not refer 
to a particular part of the human person, but “each denotes the entire 
human being, while connoting some angle of vision on who that human 
being is and what he or she is called to be.”44 As seen, Wright builds up his 
proposal mainly on the belief that the word psyche refers exclusively to the 
whole human person with the connotation that the human being has an 
“ordinary mortal life, with breath and blood sustained by food and drink. 
And so on.”45 
 
2.5.1. Wright: If Not a Dualist, then a Monist? 
 
Wright clearly speaks of a differentiated unity, of the wholeness of the 
human person, of the complete whole, of the psyche understood as the 
whole person, of a bodily death as the dissolution of the human being, and 
openly rejects a materialistic and reductive approach (physicalism). But 
then, what does Wright’s perspective entail? In that regard, Cooper may 
offer some help. Speaking of a particular kind of holism that exists among 
modern biblical scholars, he states,   
 
…[A]nother concept of holism seems to be employed by many who 
discuss Old Testament anthropology…It defines the very being of an 
entity and its constituents in terms of their systematic unity. A thing in 
its totality is simply a particular holistic organization. The parts, aspects, 
and dimensions of the being have been only in virtue of their status 
within the whole. Their existence, their nature, and their identity all 
depend on the whole. So if the whole breaks up, the parts cease to be 
what they were. No parts can survive the dissolution of the whole intact. 
They must either cease to be or become something else than what they 
were.46 
                                                 
44 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
 
45 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
 
46 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 46. 
STROMATA: THE GRADUATE JOURNAL OF CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
 
 
 123 
It is not difficult to observe that the above-mentioned quotation seems to 
describe Wright's view of the human person very well. In fact, one may 
claim that what Wright refers to when he speaks of presenting an integral-
holistic proposal is basically an ontological holism.  
 
2.5.2. Rejection of the Dualistic Understanding of the Human 
Person 
 
Throughout all the aforementioned arguments Wright has given, he 
concludes that one does not need a dualistic view that tries to provide 
answers to "the awkward gap between bodily death and bodily 
resurrection," due to the fact that the New Testament does not suggest––
and much less promote––the concept of the soul independent of the body. 
Consequently, Wright claims in its place that what one needs is what the 
Scriptures really offer: "[T]he concept of a creator God, sustaining all life, 
including the life of those who have died. Part of death, after all, is the 
dissolution of the human being, the ultimate valley of humiliation, the 
renouncing of all possibility."47 Wright asserts that to insist on the idea that 
human beings, in some way, possess a part that is not subject to mortality 
“might look suspiciously like the ontological equivalent of works-
righteousness in its old-fashioned sense.”48  
 
2.5.3. Wright’s Integral-Eschatological Proposal 
 
It is noteworthy to cite now Wright’s perspective of what happens in 
the afterlife: “At and beyond death the believer is totally dependent on 
God’s sustaining grace, and the NT’s remarkable reticence in speculating 
beyond this is perhaps to be imitated. The New Testament speaks of this 
state as a time of ‘rest,' prior to the time of ‘reigning’ in God’s new world. 
‘Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord,’ says John the Divine. Amen, 
says the Spirit (Rev. 14.13).”49  
 
                                                 
 
47 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
 
48 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
 
49 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
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In that regard, assuming that Wright holds an ontological-holistic 
understanding of the human person, his paradigm or proposal would be 
similar to this: 
 
i. Present life: Since a human being is born until her bodily death, the 
human being exists as an ontological-holistic entity. When she bodily 
dies, it happens the dissolution of the existence of the human being.50 
ii. Intermediate state: After a person bodily dies, she enters in a temporal 
intermediate state, where she does not exist in an “angelical or spiritual” 
form, but the person rests in God’s hand and what else happens there 
remains a mystery. 
iii. Ultimate resurrection: In a particular moment of the future, God will 
resurrect the person who had bodily died in the present life and that has 
been resting in God’s hand. In the resurrection event, God then will re-
embody such a person with an immortal physical body. 
 
2.6 Assessment  
 
In general terms, Wright in his article, "Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body," 
thinks of dualism at its best exclusively as a Platonic construct and forgets 
to make references to other kinds of dualisms that reject Plato's 
understanding of the soul. A second aspect to note is that Wright does not 
mention in an articulate manner his anthropological view of the human 
person. And third, Wright's paradigm is somewhat far from being a 
coherent and free-of-controversy proposal. I think his ontological-holistic 
project raises more questions than those he answers. Beyond these general 
issues, there are also significant difficulties that arise from Wright’s 
proposal. The first difficulty is that despite the fact that a person has ceased 
to be, Wright holds that she indeed goes to the intermediate state––this 
creates a continuity-discontinuity problem. The second and third issue is 
that although Wright’s ontological-holistic paradigm promotes an integral 
view of the human person, one does not know what a human person is––
this creates a problem of certainty––, and one can observe some degree of 
“dualism” in his paradigm––this creates a basic contradiction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” sec. 3. 
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III. The Issue Explained 
 
Let me start with an example as to what one encounters with the body-
soul problem: The study of dark matter in the universe, for instance, it is 
of a great complexity for scientists, because unlike the visible matter one 
observes, dark matter cannot be seen.51 Nonetheless, physics and 
astronomers have inferred its existence through theoretical paradigms. 
Similar to the existence of dark matter in the universe, the existence of a 
non-material soul that is not observable is inferred from integral 
theological reflections in the Holy Scriptures. Hence, there are scholars 
who reject the concept of the human soul as the existence of dark matter, 
but one aspect cannot be denied: rejecting the existence of the unknown 
dark matter in physics in the same way as rejecting the existence of the soul 
in theology raises more problems than the difficulties that arise when 
accepting their existence. And this issue is what I have observed in 
Wright’s exposition of the soul. By rejecting the existence of the soul as an 
ontological substance or entity different from the physical body, and by 
holding the belief in a real intermediate, Wright offers a theoretical project, 
though it may be attractive, presents serious contradictions and 
inconsistencies.  
 
3.1 The Continuity-Discontinuity Problem 
 
The belief in resurrection presupposes an absolute continuity of 
personal identity of the human person. Consequently, when Wright 
defends the belief in resurrection, he is assuming that the personal identity 
of the human being has been continuous and absolute.52 One significant 
issue that arises in Wright’s project is that it seems there is no continuity 
in the personal identity of the resurrected person. When a person dies––
and one entails an ontological holism––it becomes the dissolution of her 
existence, or alternatively, that person is transformed into another entity 
that is different from the old one. I have not found so far in Wright’s 
published works any suggestion with regard to the possibility that after 
                                                 
51 The existent of dark matter in the universe was proposed by Fritz Zwicky in 1933.  
 
52 If Wright rejects this position, he then should look for an alternate solution to the 
difficulty created, but though he may find it, the plausibility is very low that he can find 
biblical support for such a solution inside the cannon of Scripture. 
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bodily death a human person is transformed into a different entity during 
the intermediate state.  
 
The core of the problem is that if resurrection presupposes an absolute 
continuity of personal identity and a person has bodily died, where are the 
memories, personality traits, or thought patterns? Dualists solve the 
problem by affirming the existence of an ontological entity that represents 
the whole person while disembodied in the intermediate state––the soul. 
But, what about those who reject the existence of the soul as an ontological 
entity? That is exactly the position that faces Wright when affirming that 
bodily death means the dissolution of the human being: if the human being 
has ceased to be and if she does have a soul, who then will represent such 
a person during the intermediate state and ultimate resurrection?  
 
3.2 The Problem of Certainty 
  
If the human being in the present life is an ontological-holistic entity 
(her parts cannot exist outside of the whole) who is constituted by her 
physical body and all her properties (mental states, thought patterns, and 
so on), how can one explain the situation that after bodily death, such a 
human being may continue to exist "in God's hand" during the 
intermediate state? The obvious conclusion is that the person who died 
(constituted by a body and all her properties) is ontologically different from 
the person who is in the intermediate state (constituted only by her 
properties and not by her physical body). From this case, it is clear that if 
one defines the human person in terms that are strictly ontologically 
holistic, the basic contradiction becomes almost unsolvable. Affirming that 
the person who bodily dies (constituted by a physical body plus all her 
properties) and the person who is in the intermediate state (constituted by 
only her properties but without a physical body) are the same entity creates 
an issue of certainty that makes us question what constitutes a human 
person if one assumes that the human person is a holistic being. 
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3.3 The Problem of Logical Contradictions 
 
Let us think about the following premises: 
 
p1: The human person is a single ontological entity (One substance) 
p2: When a human person dies, it becomes the dissolution of her being  
(Embodied existence) 
p3: After dying, a human person goes into the intermediate state  
(Disembodied existence) 
 
In the previous system, one notes that all the three premises cannot be true 
if the “human person” of the three premises holds a continuity of 
personhood, then: 
 
● If p1 and p2 are true, then p3 is false 
● If p1 and p3 are true, then p2 is false 
● If p2 and p3 are true, then p1 is false 
 
Or to put it a different way, 
 
● A human person cannot go into the intermediate state after dying (p3 is false) 
● A human person does not really die (p2 is false) 
● A human person is not a single ontological entity (p1 is false) 
 
The indetermination of the previous set of premises is caused by 
Wright’s paradigm that holds both in the same sense at the same time the 
belief in a real intermediate state (p3) and his ontological-holistic 
understanding of the human person (p1), while claiming as a true that 
when a human person dies, it becomes the dissolution of her being (p2). I 
have assumed so far that Wright understands the human being as an 
ontological-holistic entity—that is, the human person and her properties 
are seen as a whole, and as not the sum of all the parts. 
 
IV. Solutions to Wright’s Philosophical Quandary 
 
4.1 A Subjective Existence 
 
A first potential solution to Wright’s contradictory proposal is that 
deceased human beings might exist (subjectively) sustained by God’s grace 
in a “special way” during the intermediate state, by understanding the 
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existence of ceased human beings in “God’s hand” as an “existence in 
God’s memory.” Orthodox Rabbi Aryeh M. Kaplan––one of the modern 
advocates of the existence in God’s memory––in that regard states, 
 
The real “you” is not your body or brain, you are the information 
contained in your brain––your memories, personality traits, and thought 
patterns…We may think of something existing only in memory as being 
static and effectively dead. But God’s memory is not a static thing. The 
sum total of a human personality may indeed exist in God’s memory, but 
it can still maintain its self-identity and volition, and remain in an active 
state… The concept of immortality of the soul may well be outside the 
realm of human comprehension.53 
Because Wright’s position with regard to this topic is in some sense 
ambiguous in his published works, the place where Wright stands on this 
is difficult to grasp there, yet it can be observed in the following interview 
published in Time Magazine in 2008:  
 
TIME: Is there anything more in the Bible about the period between 
death and the resurrection of the dead? 
 
Wright: We know that we will be with God and with Christ, resting 
and being refreshed. Paul writes that it will be conscious, but 
compared with being bodily alive, it will be like being asleep.54 The 
Wisdom of Solomon, a Jewish text from about the same time as Jesus, 
says "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God," and that seems 
like a poetic way to put the Christian understanding, as well.  
  
 
                                                 
53 Aryeh Kaplan, The Aryeh Kaplan Anthology: Illuminating Expositions on Jewish Thought and 
Practice by a Revered Teacher, (New York: Mesorah, 1998): 199-200. 
 
54 Wright has assumed that “being in the intermediate state” entails a conscious existence, 
yet “asleep or inactive.” The problem arises, however, of the multiple interpretations one 
may give to Paul’s use of “asleep.” For example, one might understand “being asleep” as 
a metaphor. In that respect, Cooper mentions the use of the word “asleep” in this sense 
in the New Testament for human persons in the intermediate state. He states, “…Paul 
refers to the dead as ‘asleep’ [as] ‘a metaphorically nice way of speaking of the dead’ not 
[as] an ‘ontological claim about their condition or status. In literal ontological sense, they 
do not exist.” Therefore, if one understands “asleep” literally, one faces a problem of 
plausibility (Cooper, Body, Soul, and Everlasting Life, 137).  
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TIME: But it's not where the real action is, so to speak? 
 
Wright: No. Our culture is very interested in life after death, but the New 
Testament is much more interested in what I've called the life after life 
after death—in the ultimate resurrection into the new heavens and the 
new Earth. Jesus' resurrection marks the beginning of a restoration that 
he will complete upon his return. Part of this will be the resurrection of 
all the dead, who will "awake," be embodied and participate in the 
renewal. John Polkinghorne, a physicist and a priest, has put it this way: 
"God will download our software onto his hardware until the time he 
gives us new hardware to run the software again for ourselves." That gets 
to two things nicely: that the period after death is a period when we 
are in God's presence but not active in our own bodies, and also that 
the more important transformation will be when we are again embodied 
and administering Christ's kingdom (emphasis mine.) 55  
 
One notices that Kaplan’s paradigm differs from what Wright says in 
several facets, but one aspect that must be noted is the following: Wright 
claims that persons after bodily death exist in God’s hand “conscious but 
inactive,” while Kaplan considers that they might exist in God’s memory 
“conscious and active.” In addition, in terms of understanding the human 
person as “memories, personality traits, and thought patterns,” Kaplan’s 
suggestion is closer to John Polkinghorne’s structural pattern than 
Wright’s ontological proposal.56 Despite the differences between Kaplan 
and Wright on this aspect, these two seem to understand human existence 
                                                 
55 David Van Biema, "Christians Wrong About Heaven, Says Bishop," in Time, February 
7, 2008. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1710844,00.html. 
 
56 Polkinghorne writes, “…My understanding of the soul is that it is the almost infinitely 
complex, dynamic, information-bearing pattern, carried at any instant by the matter of 
my animated body and continuously developing throughout all the constituent changes 
of my bodily make-up during the course of my earthly life. That psychosomatic unity is 
dissolved at death by the decay of my body, but I believe it is a perfectly coherent hope 
that the pattern that is me will be remembered by God and its instantiation will be 
recreated by him when he reconstitutes me in a new environment of his choosing. That 
will be his eschatological act of resurrection…In a very crude and inadequate analogy, the 
software running on our present hardware will be transferred to the hardware of the world 
to come. And where will that eschatological hardware come from? Surely the 'matter' of 
the world to come must be the transformed matter of this world…” in The Faith of a 
Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, (Minneapolis, Minn: 
Fortress Press, 1996): 163-64.  
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during the real intermediate state to be real but subjective. (Polkinghorne 
remains ambiguous with regard to affirm or not the intermediate state.) 
Important to mention is that Wright either borrows Polkinghorne's 
language to describe his integral-eschatological proposal better or 
resembles Polkinghorne's line of reasoning on the body-soul debate. For 
the purpose of this paper, I will assume the first option—yet the second 
one is plausible as well, but one needs more details on Wright's position. 
So far, the place where Wright stands with regard to his ontological 
paradigm is clearer and more definite.  
 
In general aspects, the subjective existence in the intermediate state 
seems to be a plausible solution to Wright's dilemma because speaking 
strictly in ontological terms, human beings do not exist objectively during 
the intermediate state. Therefore, it seems the subjective human existence 
is better during this temporal state in terms of resting and God's 
miraculously nourishment and sustaining, but not in physical earthly terms.   
 
4.2 A Subsistent-Immaterial Form 
 
A second potential solution to Wright's contradiction is to interpret his 
claims under the terms of the Thomistic hylomorphism. One particular 
reading of Aquinas' view of the soul is that one that holds that Aquinas 
developed and modified––but not departed from––Aristotle’s ontological 
holism so that Aquinas cannot be considered a dualist at all.57 Thus, it is 
this fact that allowed Aquinas to affirm a “subsistent immaterial form,” 
which it has an operation of its own, yet it is not complete in nature as 
substances are.58  
 
                                                 
57 Among other scholars who support the view that Aquinas is not a dualist are Robert 
Pasnau in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a, 75-
89, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 70-72; and Christopher Hughes, 
Aquinas on Being, Goodness and God, (New York: Routledge, 2015): 122-141.  
 
58 Ralph McInerny, and John O'Callaghan, "Saint Thomas Aquinas", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at 
URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/Aquinas/, sec.8, par. 2. 
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In that respect, McInerny and  O'Callaghan 59 state, 
 
A human soul is a constitutive element of the nature of a human 
substance. It is the formal principle of a human substance. It is what is 
specified when we say what the substance is. But it is incomplete. What 
it is for a soul to be is to be the form of some substance. In that sense it 
is a principle of a substance…As the principle of a nature, its nature is to 
be the formal element of a complete substance. Consequently, it doesn't 
have its own nature and is not a substance in its own right, even if it is 
capable of subsisting apart from the living body…60 
 
One notices that Wright’s ontological paradigm seems to comply with 
this Thomistic notion of the soul. In addition, the soul is neutral in relation 
to materiality.61 Under this framework, one may understand the human 
person not as a dualist entity (two substances) but as a two-principle entity 
(one substance), where the soul has the capacity of granting an identity and 
a form to the body. Therefore, at death, the body decays but the subsistent 
immaterial form (or the soul) returns to God. The bodily life and the non-
bodily existence during the intermediate state are possible; however, the 
soul in the intermediate state remains in an unnatural way: 
 
In 75.7, Thomas argues that the intellectual soul is not of the same 
species as an angel, because it is a substantial form of an animal. Angels 
are complete in their natures as incorporeal, immaterial, incorruptible 
subsistent forms—they are thus substances properly speaking. But 
Thomas had insisted all along that the soul is incomplete in its nature, 
even as it is an incorporeal, immaterial, incorruptible subsistent form—
it is not a substance properly speaking. Still, the soul can be called 
substance by analogy, insofar as it is the formal principle of a substance. 
In English it might be better to call it “substantial” rather than 
“substance.” And in that regard, it cannot be considered as forming the 
basis for a kind of substance dualism in Thomas.62 
                                                 
59 Both McInerny and O'Callaghan are Professors of Philosophy at the University of 
Notre Dame. Professor O'Callaghan, in addiction, is a permanent member of the 
Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 
60 McInerny and O'Callaghan, "Saint Thomas Aquinas," sec.8, par. 3. 
 
61 Hughes, Aquinas on Being, Goodness and God, 123. 
 
62 McInerny and  O'Callaghan, "Saint Thomas Aquinas," sec.8, par. 10. 
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This "subsistent immaterial form" has the capacity of not only storing 
a person's memories and personality but all the structural information. 
Although this "form" returns to God, yet it has consciousness despite the 
fact it cannot manifest physically without a body. Unlike Polkinghorne and 
Kaplan, Wright would say that the "real person" is not the information and 
thought structural pattern of the human being, but this "subsistent 
immaterial form" that contains them. This "form" differs from a traditional 
notion of the soul in that the former has the potential of granting 
physicality to the matter but it cannot manifest naturally without it, while 
the latter one is a complete substance. Having this into account, the 
particular reading of Aquinas's hylomorphism mentioned above would 
work for Wright's proposal and his definition of dualism: 
 
The proper response to idolatry is therefore not dualism, the rejection 
of space, time, or matter as themselves evil or dangerous, but the 
renewed worship of the Creator God… (emphasis mine).63 
 
What matters is eschatological duality (the present age and the age to 
come), not ontological dualism (an evil “earth” and a good “heaven”).64 
 
To support my claim, I argue that what Wright's "integral-
eschatological" paradigm openly denies is a Platonic dualistic-ontological 
worldview of the world, but remains ambiguous with regard to the duality 
of the human person after bodily death (an eschatological issue?). Such 
ambiguity is what allows this second option to be a plausible solution to 
Wright's impasse without entering into many conflicts with his theological 
claims. Thus, let's modify the set of premises given in section 3.3. 
 
p1': The human person is a dual-aspect ontological entity (One substance) 
p2': When a human person dies, it becomes the dissolution of her being  
       (Embodied existence: the body decays) 
p3': After dying, a human person goes into the intermediate state  
       (Disembodied existence: the form/information is in God’s hands) 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Wright, Surprised by Hope, 212. The definition provided by Wright here resembles Plato’s 
dualism. 
 
64 Wright, Surprised by Hope, 95. 
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As one notices, the indetermination has disappeared by understanding the 
human person at least as a “dual-aspect” ontological entity. The immediate 
implication of affirming as true p1, p2, and p3 is that what really defines a 
human person is not a physical body, but this subsistent form (that is, the 
mind) that creates and saves all the information, memories, patterns, and 
so on, of the human person. I should say, however, that the debate is not 
over yet since many consider that Aquinas’s theory entails some modified 
form of dualism.65 
 
V. An Objection Raised 
 
I have discussed two potential solutions to Wright's dilemma of 
holding both an ontological holism and the intermediate state. One 
significant issue that raises, however, is Wright's presumption of some 
degree of duality in his proposal. In an informal interview published on his 
blog in 2009, for instance, New Testament scholar Ben Witherington asks 
Wright some questions concerning his book Surprised by Hope. In one of 
his answers, Wright makes a reference to a temporary duality in the 
intermediate state: 
 
QUESTION FOUR 
 
Joel Green and other NT scholars have been conferencing with 
neuroscientists and writing a good deal about how the mind is simply the 
software of the brain, and without the physical body, the whole person 
simply ceases to exist. In other words, they are advocates of some sort 
of monism in the form of the equation 'no body=no person'. I take it 
from many things you say in 'Surprised by Hope' that you believe in a 
limited dualism between body and soul, or body and personality, such 
that the person survives death and goes to be with the Lord, but that 
ultimately that dualism will be resolved when the resurrection of the body 
happens, and those in Christ are made like him once and for all. How 
would you answer the monists, who insist they have mind/brain science 
on their side? 
 
 
                                                 
65 Mauricio Beuchot, for example, in “Cuerpo y Alma en el Hilemorfismo de Santo 
Tomás,” Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval No. 0 (1993): 39-46, holds that Aquinas is 
not a monist or materialist, but at least a sui-generis dualist, where he understands the 
human being as a dual-aspect single entity (40). 
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      ANSWER 
 
4. I do think -- and at this point Aquinas, and the Greek Orthodox 
theologians, and the early fathers, agree with me -- that humans are 
incomplete without a body. However, I agree with theologians Jewish 
and Christian, ancient and modern, that if there is to be a resurrection 
that presupposes some kind of continuity between the embodied person 
now and the embodied person then. One way of 'solving' this might be 
to suggest that at death we are 'fast-tracked' straight to the eschaton; I 
don't buy that because the new world will be made out of the old one, 
not created de novo, and that clearly hasn't happened yet. Another way 
of 'solving' it is to say that God 'remembers' us, not just with a kind of 
nostalgic looking back at the person we once were but are no longer, but 
that he somehow holds us in life (as the Psalmist says) within his own 
being.  
 
Hence Polkinghorne's image: God will download our software onto his 
hardware until the time when he gives us new hardware to run the 
software again for ourselves. For me the telling points are Jesus' words 
to the brigand: TODAY you will be with me in Paradise -- though Jesus 
won't be raised for another three days; and Paul's in Philippians, 'My 
desire is to depart and be with Christ which is far better'. I don't think 
Paul could have said that if he'd believed it would be a non-existent state 
prior to the resurrection. Wisdom 3 of course uses the language of 'souls 
in the hand of God', which may be a way of saying pretty much the same 
thing.  
 
I don't like thinking of this as 'dualism', but rather as a temporary duality, 
a kind of half-existence with God obviously taking the complete initiative 
to hold in being the true identity etc of persons who once had full bodily 
identity and will again...66 
 
  The last paragraph of Wright’s answer is a key point since there are 
questions that emerge more clearly concerning the coherence and 
tenability of Wright’s proposal: a) Does the affirmation of the belief in the 
intermediate state entail dualism? b) Does the rejection of dualism imply 
the rejection of duality in philosophical terms? and c) Does the affirmation 
of ontological holism imply the rejection of duality? I have assumed a 
                                                 
66 Ben Witherington, “The Good Bishop Weighs in-- Tom Wright on Surprised by 
Hope,” Ben Witherington (blog), March 13, 2009, 
http://benwitherington.blogspot.com/2009/03/good-bishop-weighs-in-tom-wright-on.html 
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positive answer for each of these three questions. However, more work 
might be needed in order to determine the implications of these questions 
in the body-soul debate. Therefore, I would say that Wright’s playing with 
the meaning of dualism vs. duality is the Achilles’ heel of Wright’s 
arguments, bringing unnecessary confusion to his proposal. The 
presumption of duality in an ontological holism is one of the main reasons 
Wright’s project suffers from philosophical and theological contradictions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After engaging N.T. Wright’s article “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body," 
one can draw some significant conclusions. For Wright, the concept of the 
soul is not appealing, but a "flat idea." There is an actual intermediate state 
where after bodily death a person goes and is sustained by God, and where 
such a person will be conscious but resting and enjoying God's presence 
while inactive bodily. In the ultimate resurrection, God will embody such 
a person with a new immortal physical body without corruption again. In 
that respect, Wright offers Christian philosophers with regard to the mind-
body debate a modified ontological holism—or at its best an Aristotelian-
Thomistic holism. In my understanding, the modified alternative that 
Wright proposes is not more tenable than some dualist paradigms.  
 
Nevertheless, without stirring up much controversy, Wright's 
paradigm is making the soul discussion in anthropological theology and 
philosophy of religion harder than is necessary. If Wright is interested in 
continuing to defend the belief in a literal bodily resurrection, he should 
move to a better theoretical paradigm than ontological holism, which 
might allow him to support his ideas while avoiding unnecessary 
contradictions and inconsistencies. From what I have discussed in this 
study, Wright's proposal is not very tenable despite the fact that there 
might exist a partial solution to his dilemma. The fact that one may find a 
particular solution to Wright’s quandary does not mean one might defend 
such an explanation theologically or philosophically at the same time. 
Many solutions to the soul-body problem may be valid in a particular sense, 
but they do not have the same degree of soundness. And this is the 
situation that happens with Wright's paradigm: although one may argue 
that Wright's contradictions in his proposal may be solved, this situation 
does not mean that such a proposal is not in conflict with important 
philosophical principles, such as Schopenhauer's Law of Thoughts and 
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Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason. Wright's paradigm might not be 
defensible philosophically, for instance. There currently exist more suitable 
models than a modified ontological holism for those who want to defend 
both the real existence of the intermediate state and the integral unity of 
the human person. Cooper's dualistic-holistic paradigm, for example, 
holds both the unity of the human person in the present life and a 
temporary duality during the intermediate state. It is a mistake that Wright 
refers to all kinds of dualism as one unified thing in order to reject it, while 
at same time presuming some duality.67  
 
In the end, a theological paradigm with regard to the body-soul debate 
that may be valid and has soundness is one that is not only faithful to the 
Scripture but also coherent. Such a paradigm, without contradictions, may 
offer both the unity of human nature in the present life and a temporal 
duality-disembodiment in the intermediate state which allows the 
continuity of personhood after bodily death. Although Wright has done a 
commendable work in defending the intermediate state-resurrection of the 
body and the unity of the human person, I find his particular view on the 
relation of both beliefs problematic and contradictory because of his 
presumption of duality in an ontological holism.
                                                 
67 Unlike most biblical scholars think, including Wright, dualism does not constitute the 
Pandora's box in biblical and Christian anthropology. Instead, it is probably Plato's 
dualistic worldview. In that regard, American Philosopher Walter Kaufmann in Critique of 
Religion and Philosophy, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990) states, “What 
makes Plato a philosopher, and not merely, the founder of a quasi-religious sect, is that 
his metaphysics with its theory of Forms is based on logical argumentation. But the 
hypostatizing of the Forms, the bold assertion that there is another world in which they 
have their being, the depreciation of the world of sense in favor of this other world-all 
this is not required by logic.” (39) Kaufmann also notes that “When Plato distinguished 
knowledge and belief, he made the grave mistake of assuming that belief is completely 
undisciplined and permits of no criteria at all. Or, if criteria for judging beliefs should be 
possible [emphasis of the author], Plato at the very least deemed any question concerning 
them beneath consideration. Since he correlated knowledge with eternal objects, such as 
his "Forms" and mathematical objects, and belief with the world of sense experience, his 
influence helped to delay the development of the natural sciences: any disciplined study 
of the changing objects of sense experience was ruled out." (303) Because Plato's 
paradigm is primarily based on his conception of humanity as Kaufman claims, Plato's 
theory of Forms, he thinks, "was initially inseparably connected with his conception of 
the relation of the body and soul and with the person…." (37-40) In light of Kaufmann's 
assertion, one sees that the center of Plato's dualism differs from the center of the Hebrew 
and Christian faith. This makes that one might affirm dualism and reject Plato's 
worldview.   
